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THE PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS OF 
ANTON ERBER (1695-1746) 
Ivan Boh 
Philosophy in its essence is transnational and transcultural. Yet, there 
are at least two senses in which one may tie the concrete phenomenon of 
philosophizing to a national level. First, one may concentrate on 
philosophical efforts on a national territory political or cultural even 
though the agents themselves may not have been nationals but foreigners 
living and acting on the territory. Secondly, one may concentrate on the 
work of philosophers who are identified as nationals, whether living on the 
territory or outside of it. The two sorts of investigation are obviously not 
mutually exclusive and both are needed for a comprehensive understanding of 
philosophical activity of a given nation. 
The present study clearly falls into the second category. The figure it 
deals with, Anton Erber, is identified as a Slovene, but one who was 
working outside the Slovene national territory, at two very important 
Austrian institutions, the Universities of Vienna and of Graz, in the first 
half of the eighteenth century. 
The basic biographical notes can be found in the short entry written by 
Frane Jellnan in Enciklopedija Slovenije l and in an earlier article by Alma 
Sodnik entitled ''Filozof Anton Erber."2 Given the ground-work by Sodnik, 
I will offer, in the first section of this paper, a brief recapitulation of her 
global assessment of Erber's philosophical opus. The subsequent sections 
will analyze some very specific features of Erber's work in one 
philosophical discipline, viz., logic. The concluding section will offer 
some generalized remarks about Erber's place in philosophy among the 
Slovenes. 
1. Biographical and Bibliographical Notes 
Anton Erber was born in Dole near Ljubljana in 1695, became member 
of the Jesuit Order, taught for four years at the College in Ljubljana, became 
professor of philosophy, law, and theology in Vienna and in Graz. At the 
latter institution he even served as chancellor. In 1744 he became rector of 
the College in LjUbljana. He died in 1746, in LjUbljana. He wrote on logic 
and on theoretical (as opposed to practical or moral) philosophy, that is, on 
ontology and natural philosophy. 
I Cf. Enciklopedija Slovenije, vol.3, 54, s.v. "Erber Anton." An account of Erber by F. Jerman is also 
given in his Slovenska modroslovna pamet, Ljubljana: Pres emova Druz ba, 1987, 26-27. One may 
also note J. Kos, Oris filozofije (2. izdaja), Ljubljana: Cankarjeva Zaloiba, 1970, 284. 
2 Cf. "Filozof Anton Erber", in lzbrane Razprave (zbral in uredil F. Jerman), Filozofska knjiz nica, 
zvezek xvi, Ljubljana, Slovenska Matica, 1975, 229-241. In this pioneering article Sodnik states: 
"Gotovo je, da ne moremo prej mislili na sintezo te snovi [i.e. materials by Slovene philosophers], 
dokler podrobno ne poznamo posameznih del (231 )." My present study of Erber's logico-
philosophic contribution 10 the field was undertaken with the hope that it may serve as an element in 
an eventual formulation of a comprehensive history of Slovene philosophy. 
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As expected of the Jesuits, Erber subscribed to a version of scholastic 
philosophy rooted in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1275) and 
Duns Scotus (1265?-1308?), the two giants of the Dominican and the 
Franciscan orders respectively, and in the philosophy of the prominent 
Spanish Jesuit Francisco Suarez (1548-1617). Sodnik acknowledges the 
heavy debt Erber owed to the earlier thinkers, but she also adds that Erber 
"went his own way."3 What she meant by these remarks is not that he was 
an eclectic but rather that he philosophized within the framework of the 
philosophy of the Jesuit order, i.e., along the Suarezian lines of 
development of scholasticism. 
Sodnik notes three distinguishing features of Erber's philosophy. The 
first is his predilection for and extensive treatment of topics such as "the 
problem of universals, distinctions, theory of bodies, causes, and 
continuum."4 The second is his polemical stand against the basic position of 
Descartes, in particular "against Descartes' theory of bodies, the question of 
extension and its finite or infinite divisibility, the problem of motion, of 
sensible quantities, the concept of soul and the relation of soul and body, the 
concept of animal, the problem of the methodic doubt and its significance 
for the theory ofknowledge ... "5 
The third distinguishing feature of Erber's philosophy noted by Sodnik 
is the particular method which he uses: "He states the problem, adds remarks 
to clarify concepts, then there follows the thesis, objections to it, and 
replies. To his own theses he adds the arguments of adversaries as objections 
and then offers his own definitive solutions."6 Sodnik is aware that this is 
basically a scholastic position but she thinks that it has sufficient 
modifications to count as a novelty, especially in its brevity of expression 
and pedagogically clear method. She adds that this may have been a result of 
the Jesuit accommodation to the humanist reform by adopting its practical 
method if not its anti-Aristotelian or anti-scholastic spirit. 
2. A Conception of the History of Logic as the Point 
of Departure for Our Study 
The primary works of Erber listed by Sodnik are Institutiones dialect-
icae (1750), and the three volumes of Cursus philosophicus : Tractatus I: In 
universam logicam (1750), Tractatus II: In Physicam Generalem (1750) and 
Tractatus III: In Physicam Particularem (1751). 
For my present study I selected topics from the Institutiones logicae 
(in the 1761 reprint), and partly took into account the Curs us 
Philosophicus, Tractatus I: In Universam Logicam. My attempt is not to 
present a surveyor an exposition of the most important topics that one 
would reasonably expect to be treated in a Jesuit manual in line of the idea 
of ratio studiorum of the Jesuit Order; from that point of view, Erber's work 
is simply a presentation of concepts or simple apprehensions, propositions 
3 Izbrani spisi, 232. 
4 Izbrani spisi, 232. 
5 Izbrani spisi, 232. 
6 Izbrani spisi, 233. 
ERBER'S PHILOSOPHICAL CONTRIBUTIONS 59 
or judgments, and arguments or inferences. Instead, my selection and 
elaboration of topics is based on the idea of our own history of logic 
expressed by Bochenski as a cycle of rises and declines rather than a steady 
progression of qualitative and quantitative achievements.7 
According to this idea, logic in the Western world achieved its rise and 
its first peak (actually a two-headed peak) in Aristotle's categorical and 
modal syllogistics and in the Megaric-Stoic theory of propositionallogic.8 
It declined during the period of 300 BC to about the 12th century when the 
logic of proprietates terminorum and the logic of consequences was 
rediscovered and the new peak was reached in this case a single one, giving 
a proper place of priority to the theory of consequences and subordinating 
the syllogistic theory and in fact the whole term logic to consequence 
theory.9 
This period of high-scholastic logic was followed by another period of 
decline, from about 1500 to the 1850s, during which with the notable 
exception of Leibniz and Lambert nothing exciting was going on in the 
field: the logic of the art of thinking of A. Amauld lO and a variety of diluted 
stereotyped texts was transmitted and perpetuated in the new school-systems, 
and Kant's harsh pronouncment about the lack of progress in the field of 
logic could, in the light of this, be at least understood, although not 
condoned. We find a new rise of logic with George Boole, Augustus De 
Morgan, and others, during the second half of the 19th century, perhaps 
reaching a third peak in the three volumes of Russell Whitehead's Principia 
Mathematica (1910-13) and continuing in the developments of modal, II 
epistemic,12 and deontic 10gic!3 of our own decades. Many of the Anglo-
American analytic moves in our century are seen to echo the disputes of 
Oxford, Paris, Padua, Heidelberg, Vienna, Prague, etc., of the 14th century. 
Yet achievements at this third peak of the history of logic are a genuine 
rediscovery, not a result of some secret textual transmission and subsequent 
development. 
Given this conception of the history of logic in the West and noting a) 
the period, and b) the tradition within which Erber's work is located, I 
investigate, on the one hand, how much of solid logic matter has been lost 
by 1750 in a manual which is still within the scholastic tradition but 
7 Cf. I.M. Bochenski, Hislory of Formal Logic (tr. Ivo Thomas), New York: Chelsea Pub!. Co., 1977, 
2-23. 
8 For an excellent early treatment of this period of the history of logic see Benson Mates, Sloic Logic, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1953. A very useful general introduction to the ancient 
schools of logic-as well as to the whole history of logic in the West-is William and Martha Kneale, 
The Development of Logic, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962. 
9 Cf. P. Boehner, Medieval Logic: An OUliine of lIS Development from 1250 10 c. 1400, Chicago 
University Press, 1952, es 77-96. Another early work on medieval logic from the point of view of 
modern formal logic is E. A. Moody, TrUlh and Consequence in Mediaeval Logic (Studies in Logic 
and the Foundations of Mathematics), Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1953. 
10 A. Arnauld & P. Nicole, La Logique, ou l'art de penser, Paris, 1662. 
II One of the leading figures in the development of alethic modal logic was C. I. Lewis in his Survey 
of Symbolic Logic, Berkeley, 1918; and C. I. Lewis & C. H. Langford, Symbolic Logic, New York, 
1932. 
12 For an influential early work, see Jaakko Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief, Cornell University Press, 
1962. 
13 One of the pioneering works in the field is G. H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1951. 
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struggling under the demands of humanism. On the other hand I look for 
the characteristic and innovative features of Erber's work which may be seen 
to be genuine advances in the discipline of logic and which have become 
part of our own twentieth-century logical corpus. 
3. A Theory of Supposition 
Let us start with an examination of the so-called supposition theory. 
Supposition is one of the seven properties of terms recognized by Erber, and 
it may be understood as the manner in which categorematic tenus, when 
used in propositions, stand for "things." 
Of special philosophical significance is Erber's first division of 
supposition into simple and personal. "Simple supposition is an acceptance 
of a telll1 for the thing as subject of some cognition ... ; e.g. in 'Animal is a 
genus' the tellll 'animal' (ly animal) is taken for animal as subject of a 
cognition which abstracts animal and its differences."14 As opposed to this, 
a term has personal supposition when it is taken for the thing as it exists in 
reality; for example, "when I say, 'An animal is living', the term 'animal' is 
taken for animal as it exists, living independently of any operation of the 
mind. "15 It is clear that the issue here is at least in part ontological (what 
kinds of entity are being referred to ?). However, we note here only one very 
important formal consequence of the distinction, viz., that we may not make 
an inference from 'Animal is a genus' to 'Man is a genus,' while we may 
make it from 'An animal is living' to 'A man is living.' 
This brings us to a further sub-division of suppositio, dividing personal 
supposition into singular and common; 'Peter' in 'Peter is running' has 
singular supposition, whereas 'man' in 'A man is running' has general 
(communis) personal supposition. Proper names, demonstrative pronouns, 
and definite descriptive phrases (or ostensive uses of common telllls) would 
seem to be typical cases of terms with singular supposition. 16 
Erber's next division is that of a general personal supposition into 
distributive, conjunctive, determinate, and indeterminate. 17 A general term 
has distributive supposition if it is preceded by a syncategorematic sign 
'every' (omnis), or its equivalent, which makes the term in a proposition 
stand for all individual members of its extension. The example he gives, 
'Every man is an animal', is clear, since the general term 'man' is used 
(conjunctively) for each individual man, but his remark that it is 'every man' 
(ly omnis homo) rather than 'man' (ly homo) is curious. The terlll 'man' is 
general or common (communis) independently of any deterlllination: its 
associated concept is 'living, sentient, rational substance or thing.' For how 
many if any individuals is the term used to stand, and how it stands for 
them, depends on the syncategorematic terllls such as 'every' (omnis), 'some' 
14 "Simplex [suppositio] esl acceptio termini pro re, prout substante alicui cognitioni, ut cum dico: 
Animal esl genus; ly animal accipitur pro animali, prout substante cognitioni abstrahenti animal a suis 
differentiis." (lnsliluliones dialeclicae, # 56,46). 
15 "Personalis [suppositio] est acceptio termini pro re, prout existit a parte rei, ut cum dico: animal esl 
vivens; ly animal accipilur pro animali prout exsistit [sic] a parte rei: cum independenter ab omni 
ope ratione intellectus sit vivens." (lnsl., # 56,46). 
16 lnsl., # 57, 46f. 
17 lnsl., # 57, 47. 
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(aliquis) in which it occurs. However, it is not 'every man' (ly omnis homo) 
but 'man' (ly homo) which qualifies as categorematic term which is the only 
kind that can have the property of supposition at all. From what I'gather in 
the sequel of Erber's text, the talk of 'every man' as a term is merely an 
unfortunate slip, but I am aware of the possibility of such a parsing of 
sentences and fOllnulation of terms since it is discussed by the prominent 
Oxford philosopher Peter Geach in his Reference and Generality.18 Were it 
not for the rest of Erber's text, I would have to concede that Erber could be 
construed as forging on this point a new analysis rather than as merely 
presenting the best medieval one. 
Assuming that a, b, c, etc. are individual constants and 'F', 'G', etc, 
common terms, we can depict Erber's idea of distributive supposition by the 
following descent to singulars: 
'Every F is G, therefore Fa is G and Fb is G and Fc is G, etc.' 
Alternatively we could think of a scheme in which F1, F2, etc. and G 1, 
G2, etc. are construed as ostensive uses of common terms and offer the 
descent to singulars in this manner: 
'Every F is G, therefore F1 is G and F2 is G, etc.' 
And, making a disjunctive descent under the predicate telIll 'G' we get F1 is 
(G 1 or G2) and F2 is (G 1 or G2), etc. 
Of course one could argue that if we restrict the universe of individuals 
to a finite realm, say {a, b, c}, the analysis of 'Every F is G' in tellns of 
conjunction of corresponding singular propositions, is in fact a logical 
equivalence and not merely a one way implication; however, Erber explicitly 
speaks of descent to singulars only, and not of equipollence (which he 
reserves for more familiar principles of the Square of Opposition, 
Conversion, Obversion, etc .. ) 
Erber has some interesting classes of cases still falling under 
distributive conjunctive supposition which I cannot go into. Likewise, I 
cannot discuss here what he calls "copulative" supposition, except to point 
out that this is simply the case of a collective use of telIll with universal 
quantifier, as in 'All the apostles are twelve' where obviously no descent to 
singulars is allowed. What must be explained here is one other member of 
his last subdivision, the so-called "determinate" or "disjunctive" 
supposition. Schematically, 
'Some F is G, therefore F1 is G or F2 is G, etc.' 
In studying his discussion of the question how we find out what kind of 
supposition a term has, we find Erber in fact offering enough clues as to the 
supposition of predicate terms. He states, for example, purely formal 
conditions for supposition of predicate terms of universal affirmative or A-
proposition: "If common terms are affected by (afficiantur) an affirmative 
sign of universality, then the common term proximate to the sign of 
universality has distributive supposition while the remote common term has 
18 At this point it may be very useful to consult Peter T. Geach, Reference and Generality: An 
Examination of Some Medieval and Modern Theories, Cornell University Press, 3rd ed., 1980. 
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determinate supposition, as in 'Every man is an animal' in which 'man' has 
distributive and 'animal' determinate supposition. "19 Schematically, 
'Every F is G, therefore FI is (GI or G2 or G3) and F2 is (GI 
or G2 or G3) and F3 is (Gl or G2 or G3) ... .' 
Distributing over the consequent-side we get a conjunction of 
disjunctions: 
'Every F is G, therefore (FI is GI or FI is G2 or FI is G3) 
and (F2 is GI or F2 is G2 or F2 is G3) and (F3 is GI or F3 is 
G2 or F3 is G3) ... .' 
Erber offers a similar analysis of universal negative or E-proposition: 
"If a general tel m is affected by a negative sign of universality, both the 
proximate and the remote term have distributive supposition. "20 
Schematically, 
'No F is G, therefore FI is (not GI & not G2 & not G3), and 
F2 is (not Gl and not G2 and not G3), and F3 is (not GI and 
not G2 and not G3).' 
Distributing over 'is' we get a conjunction of conjunctions: 
'(FI is not Gland FI is not G2 and FI is not G3) and (F2 is 
not GI and F2 is not G2 and F2 is not G3) and, etc . .' 
Descent for particular negative or O-propositions is sanctioned by the 
claim that the predicate in such propositions has distributive supposition 
while the subject terms of both particular affirmative and particular negative 
proposition have detelminate supposition: 
'Some S is not P, therefore (Sl is not PI and not P2 and not 
P3) or (S2 is not PI and not P2 and not P3), or ... ; 
fully distributing over 'is' we get: 
'(Sl is not PI and Sl is not P2 and Sl is not P3) or (S2 is 
not PI and S2 is not P2 and S2 is not P3) or ... ' 
In particular affirmative or I-propositions both'S' and 'P' term have 
detelminate supposition: 
'Some S is P, therefore Sl is (PI or P2 or P3) or (S2 is (PI 
or P2 or P3) or ... etc .. ' 
We have obtained these inferences on the basis of Erber's charac-
terization of various types of supposition. If there were any doubt about 
their legitimacy, it would be dispelled by Erber's special treatment of 
descent and ascent in Institutiones Dialecticae, Pars I, a. 8. He also 
discusses several other properties of telms so characteristic of the summu-
lists William Sherwood, Peter of Spain, Lambert of Auxerre, and the whole 
subsequent medieval tradition through William of Ockham (d. 1349) and 
beyond; properties such as ampliation, restriction, appellation, etc .. 
However, we must now move on to another cluster of interesting topics 
from the realm of proposition or judgment. 
19 "Si terminus communis afficiatur syncategoremate universali affirmativo, terminus communis huic 
signo proximus supponit distributive; remotus determinate; ut omnis homo est animal, ubi homo 
supponit distributive, animal determinate." (lnst. f# 65, 52) 
20 "Si terminus communis afficiatur syncategoremate universali negativo, uterque terminus tam 
proximus quam remotus supponit distributive." (lnst. # 65, 52) 
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4. Elements of the Logic of Propositions 
As expected, Erber preserves the tradition of dividing propositions into 
simple and composite, and dividing the composite ones further into 
conjunctive, disjunctive, causal, and conditional propositions. We have just 
seen that one of the characteristic medieval theories, i.e., of properties of 
telll1S, is well preserved by Erber. We shall now investigate how much of 
the other important part of logic, the theory of propositions, Erber found to 
be worthwhile cultivating in the "humanistic" university curricula of his 
times. 
It must be pointed out that there is no special chapter on propositional 
logic as a general theory of deduction to be found in Erber, either in his 
lnstitutiones Dialecticae or in his Curs us Philosophicus. This means that 
we will have to be on the lookout for elements of such a theory in the 
contexts where he discusses compound propositions, immediate inferences, 
etc .. Our plan here is to record what might be pertinent to this topic and 
then draw conclusions on the matter. 
First, let us observe that Erber defines composite proposition strictly 
formally as "one consisting of two or more simple propositions connected 
to one another in a certain manner. "21 He lists four types of 
syncategorematic signs which are in fact propositional rather than term 
functors: 
(1) the particle 'and' fOlming a conjunctive (copulativa) 
proposition. Example: 'Peter is striving and Peter is sleeping'; 
(2) the disjunction particles 'or' (vel) and 'either. .. or' (aut ... aut), 
fOIming disjunctive proposition (disjunctiva). Example: 'Either 
(aut) Christ is mistaken or else (aut) the world will perish'; 
(3) the causal particle 'because' (quia, quoniam), fmming causal 
propositions. Example: 'Because men do not fear God, they do 
not avoid sin'; and 
(4) the particles 'if (si) and 'when' (quando), forming 
conditionals or hypotheticals; they are called so because they 
declare something about something under some condition or 
hypothesis. Example: 'If you do penitence, you will be saved.' 
It is difficult to decide whether any of these compound statements were 
intended to be interpreted truth-functionally. Even the conjunction suggests 
something more than mere claim of truth of both components as a necessary 
and sufficient condition for its truth. His comments at # 146 confirm our 
suspicion. He states: "For truth of a conjunctive proposition truth of all 
component propositions is required [i.e., we can safely assert one-way 
implication as a statement of necessary condition for truth of a conjunctive 
proposition: T'P&Q' , (T'P'& T'Q')}; hence, a conjunctive proposition will 
be false if even a single component is false" [i.e., F'P' , F'P&Q' is also a 
logical principle].22 Surprisingly Erber adds at this point that a conjunction 
21 "[Propositioj composita est, quae constat duabus, vel pluribus propositionibus simplicibus certo 
modo inter se connexis." (lnst., # 91, 70) 
22 "Nota secundo: Ad veritatem propositionis copulativae requiri veritatem singularum propositionum 
simpJicium; unde falsa erit tota, si vel unica ex simpJicibus sit falsa." (# 146, 106) 
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affilIns the conjuncts in a composite sense (pro sensu compos ito) and one 
could not speak of conjunction being true according to one part and false 
according to another part. It seems that some quasi-modal requirement is 
attached to the sufficient conditions for a conjunction. 
As for disjunctive proposition, we may wonder whether the one formed 
with vel is weak and inclusive, and the one formed with aut ... aut is strong 
and exclusive, but again Erber comes to rescue. At # 147 we find the 
following statement: "For truth of a disjunction it is sufficient that one of 
the simple component propositions be true; hence, for its falsehood it is 
required that (all) singular propositions be false."23 We can of course also 
learn about Erber's understanding of disjunction by reflecting on what kinds 
of inferences based on a disjunctive premise he allows, or disallows. 
Regarding causal propositions it is safe to say that they are not truth-
functional in anyone's system, so we should not expect them to be such by 
Erber. He says that for truth of causal proposition three things are required: 
first, that what is assumed to be the case be in fact true; secondly, that what 
is stated as caused be true, and thirdly that what is assumed to be the cause 
have with respect to the caused at least an illative relation of some cause: for 
a causal proposition asserts all these things. Erber gives examples of three 
causal propositions which fail to meet one or another of these three 
requirements: 1) Because Peter is an Apostle, he is rational; 2) Because God 
had prohibited it, Adam did not eat from the tree; and 3) Because the sun is 
shining, the stick stands in the corner.24 
Finally, the conditional formed with 'if is undoubtedly stronger than 
truth-functional, stating a connection possibly a modal one between the 
antecedent and the consequent that goes beyond the claim that the antecedent 
is not true without the consequent. However, it is interesting that Erber 
either totally identified temporal propositions formed with quando with 
conditional propositions fOlIned with si, or else left the room for a weak, 
almost truth-functional, sense of conditional in addition to the stronger, 
modalized or connexive sense. 
Erber's discussion of conditionals is occasionally couched in terms of 
theology, such as freedom, choice, foreknowledge, and providence. The 
following paragraph is very instructive: "For the truth of a conditional 
proposition (propositio conditionata) it suffices that the conditioned object 
passes over absolutely in a purified condition, even though that will never 
happen in reality, for surely the condition will never be so purified. Hence, 
this proposition is true: 'If Peter had assistance A, he would consent to it'; 
but Peter, in the case in which he would have assistance A, would place 
under his consent, even though as a matter of fact (re ipsa) he is never going 
to posit, for surely he is never going to have assistance A. But whether for 
truth of a conditioned proposition it is required over and above this that the 
23 "Nota tertio: Ad veritatem propositionis disjunctivae sufficere veritatem unius proposition is 
simplicis; unde ut sit falsa de bent singulae esse fal sae."(# 147, 106) 
24 "Nota quarto: Ad veri tat em propositionis causalis tria requiri ; primo, ut verum sit iIIud quod 
assumitur pro causa; secundo, ut verum sit illud quod enunciatur ut causatum; tertio, ut illud, quod 
assumitur pro causa, habeat respectu causati rationem alicuius causae saltern illativae; quia omnia haec 
a propositione causali affirmantur." (# 148, 106f.) 
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condition be conducive to the conditioned or at least that it have some 
connection with it is disputed by Thelogians, and those things in which a 
condition of this sort is found they call propositions conditioned under the 
conducing condition (conditionatas sub conditione conducente); and such is 
the aforementioned proposition. And they call propositions conditioned 
under the disparate condition disparate, and such is this one: "If the Turk 
were dancing at Constantinople, Peter would have been converted in 
Vienna. "25 
Some additional light on the nature of conditionals is shed by Erber in 
his discussion of truth of those propositions which are not in contingent but 
in necessary matter. If 'S is P' is in necessary matter, such a proposition is 
equivalent to an existentially conditional proposition in that the predicate 'P' 
applies to the subject'S' ex suppositione, that is, on the assumption that 
the subject exist, even though it in fact did not exist nor ever will exists. 
"The reason is that nothing else is asserted than a necessary connection 
between the predicate and the subject, and that the connection would be 
sufficiently verified in that the predicate would apply to the subject just as if 
this subjected thing existed, even if in the nature of things it did not exist... 
The proposition 'The Antichrist is rational animal' should be resolved into 
this hypothetical proposition, "If the Antichrist exists, it is rational 
animal."26 The conditional with this strong connection would certainly not 
be simply a material or truth-functional conditional represented by our 'p 
->Q.' 
Likewise for negative propositions in necessary matter: 'A goat is not a 
stag' is "resolved into" this conditional, 'If a goat exists, it is not a stag' 
[(x)(Sx • -Px)]Y 
But then comes a surprising claim: Erber says that contraries should not 
be able to be both true in any matter. Let us see why this claim is 
surprising. Erber's doctrine of conditionals is this. He seems to have a place 
for temporalized conditionals 'When P, Q', which could be represented as 
simply claiming that 'P • Q' in the sense of '-(P & -Q)'; i.e. they could be 
treated as material conditionals. He also had a place for stronger condi-
tionals, mod ali zed or connexive in character. We could conceivably treat 
25 "Nota quinto: Ad veritatem propositionis conditionatae sufficere. si obiectum conditionatum 
transeat in absolutum purificata conditione, etsi illud re ipsa numquam fiat; quia nimirum numquam 
purificatur conditio: unde vera est haec: si Pelrus haberel auxilium A, eidem consenlirel: modo Petrus 
in casu, quo haberet auxilium A, poneret sub illo consensum, etsi illud reipsa numquam sit: quia 
nimirum numquam habebit auxilium A. Utrum autem ad veritatem conditionatae insuper requiratur, ut 
conditio conducat ad conditionatum, vel saltern aliquam cum illo habeat connexionem; disputant 
theologi, et i1las quidem, in quibus ejusmodi conditio reperitur vocant conditionas sub conditione 
conducente, qualis est praedicta propositio; alias vero conditionatas sub conditione disparata 
appellant disparatas, qualis est ista: Si Turca Conslantinopoli sallarel; Pelrus Viennae 
converterelur." (# 149, 107f.) 
26 "Ratio est; quia nihil aliud affinnatur, quam necessaria connexio inter praedicatum, et subjectum, 
quae connexio sufficienter verificatur per hoc, quod preadicatum conveniat subjecto, hoc ipso, quod 
illud exsistat, etsi re ipsa non exsistat; atque in hoc fundatur illud principium, quod in 
propositionibus necessariis Iy eSI accipiatur praecise in vi copulae; adeoque haec propositio: 
Anlichrislus eSI animal ralionale, resolvatur in hanc hypotheticam, sive conditionalem: si 
Antichrislus exsislil, eSI animal rationale." (# 107, 81) 
27 Cf. # 108, 82: "Per ejusmodi propositiones nihil aliud significatur, quam repugnantia inter 
preadicatum, et subjectum quae sufficienter verificatur per hoc, quod distinguatur ex suppositione 
quod exsistant. Unde haec propositio: Hircus non eSI ceryus; resolvitur similiter in hanc 
conditionalem: Si Hircus exsislil [sicl, non esl ceryus." 
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them as strict conditionals, i.e. 'P ---> Q' in the sense of '-M(P & -Q).' But if 
we linked conditionals, as we do nowadays, with a non-existential 
interpretation of universal categorical propositions and reduce 'All S are P' 
, 
to the fOlll1 '(x)(Sx ---> Px)' and 'No S is P' to '(x)(Sx ) U Px)" we are in 
trouble. On modem view, if there are no S, i.e. if the antecedent of our 
generalized conditionals tum out not to be satisfied by anything, both 
universal affilll1ative and universal negative propositions tum out to be true. 
They are not contraries at all if by definition two propositions are contraries 
if and only if they could not both be true although they could both be false. 
As Brentano, much later, saw very clearly, if there are no S at all, then it is 
true that there are no S which are P and likewise no S which are not P. But 
we saw that Erber denies that two such propositions could ever be both true 
in necessary matter. The reason is that in Erber's view of conditionals the 
connection between the antecedent and the consequent, just as that between 
Sand P in categoricals, is the very theme of assertion. The existence of 
individuals which are S is not pertinent at all since S is a supposition only 
in an imaginative sense. 
One of the more perplexing views proposed by Erber is "that a conjunc-
tive proposition is equivalent to a universal one and that a disjunctive 
proposition is equivalent to a particular one."2S At first it may seem that he 
is anticipating the twentieth-century model universe interpretation of 
quantified statements. Thus, in a domain of three individuals {a,b,c}, (x)Fx 
== (Fa & Fb & Fe) and (Ex)Fx (Fa v Fb v Fe). However, Erber was 
apparently not motivated by a desire to eliminate quantifiers in favor of 
extensional domains; he was concerned at this juncture with contradictory 
and contrary opposites of quantified propositions, and he observed a certain 
parallel between conjunctions and disjunctions, and universal and particular 
propositions respectively. His terminology of # 150 is misleading, but 
Table 3 in the Appendix is given to illustrate what he means, and is indeed 
successful. First his text: ''To an affirmative conjunctive proposition the 
contradictory opposite is a negative disjunction; and the contrary opposite is 
a negative conjunction. To a negative conjunction the contradictory opposite 
is an affirmative disjunction and the contrary opposite is an affirmative 
conjunction."29 The first sentence misleadingly suggests that '(P & Q)' and 
'-(P v Q)' are contradictories, the second that 'p & Q' and '-(P & Q)' are 
contraries, the third that '~(P & Q)' and 'P v Q' are contradictories and the 
fourth that '-(P v Q)' and 'p & Q' are contraries. As it stands, this is 
obviously incorrect. Fortunately Erber provides Table 3 in the Appendix, 
and he refers us to that Table for illustration. It becomes clear that what he 
has apprehended is that if we place 'P & Q', '-P & -Q', 'P V Q' and '-P v -Q' 
in the normal comers for A, E, I and 0 propositions, respectively, on the 
Square of Opposition, all the laws of Opposition would be preserved: 'p & 
28 "Nota sex to: Propositionem copulativam aequivalere universali, et disjunctivam particulari: unde 
eadem proportionaliter est oppositio propositionum copulativarum, et disjunctivarum, quae 
universalium et particularium." (# 150, 108) 
29 "Copulativae affirmativae opponitur contradictorie negativa disjunctiva; contrarie negativa 
copulativa; copulativae negativae opponitur contradictorie affirmativa disjunctiva; contrarie affirmativa 
copulativa." (# 150, J08) 
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Q' and '-P v -Q' would be contradictories, and likewise '-P & -Q' and 'P v 
Q'; 'P & Q' and '-P & -Q' would be contraries; while 'P v Q' and '-P v -Q' 
would be subcontraries. Moreover, 'P & Q' entails 'P v Q' and '-P & -Q' 
entails '-P v -Q.' 
It may be mentioned that in TABLE 3, both quantified propositions 
CAll men are running') and singular propositions CPeter is running') and 
their negations are used to illustrate his point. Thus, Erber does not offer an 
analysis of quantifiers, but he does show at least a de facto awareness of the 
so-called De Morgan laws.30 
We should also study his TABLE 1 on the basis of which one could 
affirm the following equipollences of quantifiers (given that A - - -0 and 
E == == -I): 
(x) == == -(Ex)-
(Ex) == == -(x)-
. 
5. General Theory of Consequence 
-(x) == == (Ex)-
-(Ex) == == (x)-
Although we look in vain for a special chapter on the general theory of 
consequence in Erber's works, we do find some elements of this very 
important doctrine . which can serve as a clue to the reconstruction of the 
idea. In his Institutiones Dialecticae, Pars iii, a.3, pp.118-122, Erber offers 
the standard division of argument into four species: syllogism, enthymeme, 
induction, and example. He describes 'enthymeme' as "an argument in which 
from one proposition another one is inferred." Example: 'Peter is a man, 
therefore he is an animal.' And he uses the typical terminology of 
consequence-theory, saying that the proposition which implies another one 
is the antecedent and that the one inferred is the consequent.31 Consequence, 
then, is seen by him occasionally to be the same as 'enthymematic 
argument', i.e. an argument in which a premise is suppressed as self-evident. 
We find a further characterization of consequence in # 175, where Erber 
explains both the ingredients of inference and the relevant tellninology: 
"Note that three things are to be found in any argumentation: that from 
which something is inferred, that which is inferred, and the connection of 
one with the other. The first, if it is a single proposition, is called the 
antecedent, if it consists of two propositions, we speak of premises. The 
second is called the consequent. The third is the consequence. Hence, these 
are very different things: consequent and consequence; just as the inferred and 
the inference.'132 
Erber stresses the fact that a consequent may be false even while the 
consequence is sound (bona). He offers an example: 'Peter has wings; 
therefore he can fly.' It may also happen conversely, that the consequent is 
30 Cf. P. Boehner, "Bemerkungen zur Geschichte der De Morganschen Gesetze in der Scholastik", 
Archiv fur Philosophie 4 (1951), 113-146. 
31 "Quid est Enthymema? .. Est argumentatio, in qua ex una propositione infertur ahera, ut Petrus est 
homo; ergo est animal. Ex quibus prima propositio dicitur antecedens, secunda consequens." (# 
168, 119) 
32 "Nota primo: In omni argumentatione tria reperiri: iIIud, ex quo aliquid infertur, iIIud, quod infertur, 
et connexionem unius cum aJtero. Primum, si sit unica propositio, dicitur antecedens, si duae, 
praemissae; secundum dicitur consequens, tertium consequentia. Unde, aliud est consequens, aliud 
consequentia: sicut aliud est iIIatum, aliud iIIatio." (# 175, P 122) 
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true but the consequence unsound (mala). His example of this is: 'The sun is 
shining, therefore the stick stands in the comer.' The reason behind both 
cases is the same: It is the question of connection or lack of it between the 
antecedent and the consequent. The connection should obviously not be 
construed as a real relation but a logical one which may hold even between 
countefactualities, 'Peter has wings' and 'Peter can fly.'33 
Erber recognizes some curious features of consequence as opposed to 
consequent: "A'consequence could never have its senses distinguished 
(numquam distingui posse); only a consequent can [have its senses 
distinguished]. The reason is that a consequence consists of what is 
indivisible, that is, in the connection of the antecedent and the consequent; 
and this either obtains, (and then the consequence is simply to be granted) or 
else it does not obtain (and it is then simply to be denied). On the contrary, 
a consequent could have several senses, and it is then possible for the 
connection to obtain between the antecedent and the consequent in one sense 
but not in another sense of the consequent. "34 
Erber's division of 'sound consequence' is into three sub-species. It can 
be sound (a) materiaIly only, (b) formally only, (c) both materially and 
formally. Example of the first: 'Peter is an animal, therefore he is a man.' A 
counterexample: 'A horse is an animal, therefore it is a man.' Example of 
the second: 'Every A is B, every C is A; therefore every C is B.' Example of 
the third: 'Every animal is a substance, every man is an animal; therefore 
every man is a substance.'35 
There are structural features of Erber's view regarding the nature of 
consequence resembling those of Ralph Strode (d. 1387) and the later British 
tradition as cultivated at north-Italian universities, especially Padua, during 
the 15th century. Instead of an appeal to alethic modal notions when 
defining consequence relation [e.g. 'P infers Q' if -M(P & -Q)], Strode 
speaks of illation in a way suggestive of identity of "understandings", that 
is, of the consequent "being understood in" the antecedent.36 Erber says the 
following: "When ilIation is fonnally sound, as happens in all correct syllo-
gisms, when the premises are simply granted, one cannot distinguish the 
consequent from them. The reason is because when the illation is fonnally 
sound, then for that reason the identity of the two extremes is affirmed in 
the conclusion; for in the premises the identity of the two extremes with a 
33 Cf. # 176, 122f. 
34 "Nota tertio: Consequentiam nunquam distingui posse, sed tantum consequens. Ratio est: quia 
consequentia consist it in indivisibili; in connexione nimirum antecedentis cum consequenti, quae vel 
datur, et tunc consequentia est simpliciter concedenda, vel non datur, et tunc est simpliciter neganda. 
E contra, consequens potest habere plures sensus, darique connexio antecedent is cum consequenti, si 
hoc accipiatur in aItero sensu. In tali igitur casu debet distingui consequens et concedi consequentia." 
(# 177, 123) 
35 Cf. # 178, 124. 
36 Strode's definition of consequence sound de forma: "Consequentia bona de forma dicitur cuius si 
sicut adequate significatur per antecedens intelligitur, sicut etiam adequate significatur per 
consequence intelligitur; ut si quis intelligit te esse hominem, intelliget te esse animal. Et ideo dicitur 
quod in tali consequentia consequens est de formali intellectu antecedentis." Consequentiae. Ed. by 
W K. Seaton, Berkeley: University of California Diss., 1973, 2. 
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common third thing is affirmed without there being any distinction between 
them. "37 
While this meager content of Erber's Institutiones Dialecticae is a far 
cry from scholastic theories at their best, it is nevertheless a semblance of 
transition to the rediscovery of propositional logic and theory of deduction 
in our own century. 
The Ohio State University 
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POVZETEK 
FILOZOFSKI DOPRINOS ANTONA ERBERJA 
Anton Erber (1695-1746), Slovenec, znanstvenik, clan jezuitskega reda in 
profesor na dunajski in graski univerzi, je obravnaval logiko na dveh ravneh: v 
Institutiones Logicae predstavi predmet v obliki sistematicnega uvoda v znanost 
o kriterijih doslednega izvajanja; v prvem zvezku svojega monumentalnega dela 
Cursus Philosophicus pa razpravlja globlje 0 filozofskih problemih logike. Obe 
razpravi sta zamisljeni v neo-scholasticni tradiciji, a njegova izbira specijicnih 
tem in problemov ter pedagoSki nacin predvajanja oc ividno odraia tei nje 
humanisticnega programa na univerzah v prvi polovici 18. stoletja. Avtor tega 
clanka izhaja s stalisca Bochenskega, da zgodovina logike ni linearni razvoj 
znanosti 0 c loveskem razumu, marveC nekakSna serija periodic nih razumskih 
zagonov, katerih vsak naj bi imel svojo lastno problematiko, z vrhuncem, in 
eventualnim zastojem vse dokler se ne pojavi naslednja razlicica ali zvrst log ike. 
Tako najdemo (i) aristotelsko obdelavo log ike pojmov ter stoicno-megarsko 
predstavo propozicionalne log ike v 4. in 3. stoletju pred nasim stetjem; (ii) 
logiko lastnosti terminov in logiko konsekvanc v 13., 14. in 15. stoletju 
nasega stetja; ter (iii) formalizirano logiko ali logistiko, skupaj z obdelavo 
meta logic nih teoremov, v 20. stoletju. S tega vidika sledi, da spada delo Erberja 
v enD izmed dolgih period zastoja, torej v vmesno stopnjo med srednjevesko in 
moderno razlicico logike. Prispevek skusa ug'otoviti najvainejse sestavine, ki 
naj bi preostale - ceprav morda v 'humanisticni preobleki' - s sam ega vrhunca 
srednjeveske log ike, in morebitne elemente, ki naj bi bili naperjeni v smer 
logistike. ceprav so najdbe v obeh ozirih sorazmeroma skromne, so vendarle 
dovolj vaine za morebitno izcrpno obdelavo log ike pri Slovencih. 
37 "Quando iIlatio est formaliter bona, uti erit in omni syllogismo recto, concessis simpliciter 
praemissis non posse distingui consequens. Ratio est: quia, quando iIlatio est formaliter bona, tunc 
ideo in conclusione affirmatur identitas duorum extremorum inter se; quia in praemissis affirrnata est 
identitas duorum extremorum cum uno tertia absque omni distinctione," (# 179, 125) 
